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The Tunisian Winter Campaign From the time of the tragic and expensive withdrawal from Djedeida, "General Mud" continued to operate against us, while the Axis went on building up strength. While the Luftwaffe in Tunisia was probably no stronger than our forces, its bombers could operate from the comparative safety of Sardinia and Sicily and its fighters were favored with all-weather fields and a short supply line. The First Army's race to Tunis had been lost in large part because of the unseasonable rains which turned the fields into morasses, and because there were not enough long rang fighters to cover the advance when flying from Allied fields on the Algerian-Tunisian border. The winter that followed was one of the worst on record; it was said, quite understandably, that this was the first major military campaign undertaken there at this time of year since the Punic Wars. the season had gone well into March before any extensive general ground movement could be undertaken in the north, though the Eighth Army, advancing over the sands of Tripolitania, was able to drive Rommel before it and across the Tunisian border. During this time the supply and airfield situation remained discouraging in Tunisia, although there were many improvements on the fields in Algeria and Morocco. On 11 December 1942 the area eastward from the Algerian-Tunisian border was assigned to the advanced echelon of the XII Fighter Command with headquarters at Tebessa. From Bougie to the border of Tunisia was the territory of XII Bomber Command. West of it to Cape Tenes was the Central Algerian Composite Wing, which never really operated; from Cape Tenes to Oujda and the border of Spanish Morocco was the Western Algerian Composite wing under the rear echelon of XII Fighter Command; the Moroccan Composite Wing operated in Morocco. All wings were activated 26 January 1943. XII Fighter Command's advance echelon moved back to La Senia 12 January 1943, and presently took over control of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Air Defense Wings. The 2d covered Morocco; the 1st covered the Oran sector, extending from the border of Spanish Morocco to Cape Tenes; and the 3d covered the Algiers region, extending from Cape Tenes to Bougie. XII Bomber Command retained the territory from Bougie eastward. In order to facilitate XII Fighter Command's work, certain signal air warning battalions and fighter control squadrons were assigned to it. The mission of XII Fighter Command was to provide:
On 15 February 1943 the Fighter Command and the defense wings were taken into the Coastal Air Force. In August the 1st, 2d, and 3d Air Defense Wings became respectively the 62, 63d, and 64th Fighter Wings, and the last-named was transferred to XII Ai Support Command. The RAF General Reconnaissance Wing, organized chiefly to protect shipping, began operations from Tafaraoui on 11 November and later moved to Blida. During November and December 572 sorties were flown, of which 280 were sea sweeps and 261 convoy escorts. Twenty-seven submarines were attacked. The work of this coastal command, though often unspectacular and even dreary, was of primary importance in bringing convoys safely into port and enabling supply organizations to rush essential materials to the front. In February the assignment was taken over by the newly organized Coastal Air Force. The Allied Air Force was activated 5 January 1943 and included all USAAF, FAF, and RAF units in Northwest Africa. General Spaatz was designated commander. The Allied Air Support Command was established under the AAF on 22 January, composed of XII Air Support Command, RAF 242 Group, Photo Reconnaissance, and other units as assigned. Six weeks after its formation the Allied Air Force, as a result of the Casablanca Conference, was inactivated and replaced by the Northwest African Air Forces. New combat units, both RAF and USAAF, continued to arrive and were fanned out as close to the front as was operationally possible. The day fighter elements of Eastern Air Command were organized in 242 Group, and this was brought up to Souk-el-Arba, as air cooperation with the First Army in northern Tunisia. As the danger from Spain decreased and the Tunisian emergency became more apparent, U. S. II Corps in southern Tunisia received additional air cooperation. XII Fighter Command and some of its elements were withdrawn for coastal work farther east, and XII Air Support Command was brought up and based mainly at Youks-les-Bains and Thelepte airfields. Meanwhile the B-17' were grouped near Biskra and the medium bombers near Constantine. Twelfth Air Force Status Report as of 2 January 1943 placed the figures for that organization at 755 aircraft assigned and 520 operational. On the 5th, the RAF Middle East Review gave 251 as the number of aircraft of the RAF in this theater. One must also take into account, in estimating Allied air strength, the squadrons in Malta and the Western Desert and Ninth Air Forces. Allied ground forces consisted of the British First Army north of Pont du Fahs, and of four French divisions and the U. S. II Corps south of that point. Notwithstanding Allied bombing efforts, which got well under way in December, von Arnim, the German commander in Tunisia, succeeded in amassing respectable forces and supplies. On 1 January it was estimated that he commanded 30,000 Germans and about 15,000 Italians, together with 140 serviceable German tanks and 60 Italian. His bomber strength was based mostly in Sardinia, Sicily, and southern Italy, and his fighters principally in Tunisia. It was estimated that there were about 610 aircraft, 225 of them Ju-88 bombers, and 150 Me-109 and FW-190 fighters; 55 to 60 percent were supposed serviceable. There were approximately 560 Italian aircraft, 50 percent of them fighters, of which half were thought serviceable. Von Arnim's Germans were chiefly in the north opposite the First Army, while Italians held the center south. A little later, however, Rommel reinforced the south with his 21st Armored Division plus Italian Infantry. |
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